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THE TERMINATION OF TREATIES AND EXECUT[VE
AGREEMENTS BY THE UNITED STATES:
THEORY AND PRACTICE
RANDALL H. NELSON'*
The most universally accepted principle of international law
relating to the subject of treaties is the doctrine of pacta sunt ser-
vanda.1 The normal operations of international intercourse, how-
ever, make necessary from time to time the termination of treaties
and other international agreements. Logically enough, a body of
international law has developed with respect to the subject of
termination, and certain general principles have been established.
Some of these principles are controversial. 2 The discussion here will
be confined to the constitutional law and practice of the United
States relative to the termination of treaties and international agree-
ments with emphasis on the period since 1940. The international law
principles will be introduced where they are relevant to the dis-
cussion.
Green H. Hackworth enumerates the following procedures by
which treaties may be terminated in accordance with international
law: (1) notice by one of the parties pursuant to the terms of the
treaty, (2) fulfillment of the provisions of the treaty, (3) expiration
of the period of time for which the treaty was concerned, (4) ex-
tinguishment of one of the parties in the case of a bilateral treaty,
or of the subject matter of the treaty, (5) agreement of the parties,
(6) conclusion of a new treaty covering the same subject matter or
one wholly inconsistent with the earlier treaty, (7) denunciation by
one party with acquiescence by the other, and (8) effect of war.3
Although not included in this list, the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus,
"a tacit condition, said to attach to all treaties, that they shall cease
to be obligatory so soon as the state of facts and conditions upon
*Assistant Professor, Government Departmen', Southern Illinois Uni-
versity.
1. The doctrine of pacta sunt servanda is a principle of general inter-
national law postulating the binding force of treaties. See Kunz, The Mean-
ing and the Range of the Norm Pacta Sunt Servanda, 39 Am. J. Int'l L. 180
(1945) ; Lauterpacht, Codification and Development of International Law,
49 Am. J. Int'l L. 17 (1955).
2. See, e.g., the discussion of the effect of the outbreak of war upon
international treaty obligations in MacDonald, Jay Treaty of 1794-Abroga-
lion of Treaties by Outbreak of War-Review of Canadian and Foreign
Decisions, 34 Can. B. Rev. 602 (1956) ; with respect to the doctrine of rebus
sic stantibus, see Kunz, supra note 1, at 190; McDougal and Lans, Treaties
and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable
Instruments of National Policy: I, 54 Yale L. J. 181, 339 (1945).
3. Hackworth, Digest of International Law, V, 297 (1953).
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which they were founded has substantially changed,"'4 ought to be
included as a further basis for the termination of treaties."
Since the international agreements which are designated "trea-
ties" and "executive agreements" respectively by the constitutional
law of the United States are included under the "generic" term
"treaty" in international law,' the conditions requisite to the valid
termination of a treaty under the rules of international law are
identical with respect to executive agreements. Therefore, the
enumerated contingencies are equally applicable to both "treaties"
and "executive agreements." A survey of United States practice
during the period under study demonstrates conclusively that execu-
tive agreements and treaties have been terminated in precisely the
same way. There is no evidence to indicate other than that the
obligations assumed by the United States were of equal force and
validity irrespective of the instrument employed to consummate the
agreement.
A survey of the international agreements terminated by the
United States since 1940 shows that all such terminations fall within
the scope of one or the other of the legally accepted formulas enu-
merated above.7 There is no record of any arbitrary denunciation of
4. Black, Law Dictionary 1432 (4th ed. 1951).
5. Kunz, supra note 1, at 188.
6. Harvard Law School, Law of Treaties, Draft Convention with com-
ment, Supp., 29 Am. J. Int'l L. 439, 711 (1935) ; Brierly, Report on the Law
of Treaties, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN. 4/23, 10 (1950) ; McNair, The Law of
Treaties, British Practice and Opinions 48 (1938).
7. See the following for sample terminations:(1) Official termination of International Materials Conference. At a
meeting on December 15, 1953, the Central Group concluded that it had
accomplished its task and recommended that the Conference be officially termi-
nated as of December 31, 1953. 30 Dep't State Bull. 60 (1954).
(2) Termination of the Wheat Agreement with Pakistan. Agreement
asserted by Prime Minister Mohammed Ali to "have' served its purpose. Id.
at 760.(3) Portugal-United States Military Agreement regarding facilities in
the Azores, Sept. 6, 1951, art. XII, "This agreement will enter into effect
on date of its signature and on the same date the agreement of Feb. 2, 1948,
will cease to have validity." 27 Dep't State Bull. 14 (1952).(4) On July 28, 1952, an exchange of notes between the United States
and the United Kingdom released the government of the United States from
the obligations of Jan. 18, 1952, under which agreement the United States had
an obligation to prevent private importation of tin for the duration of the
agreement unless consultation between the two governments took place.
Id. at 266.(5) Termination of Reciprocal Trade Agreement with Turkey of 1939
by mutual consent as of Aug. 4, 1952, because Turkey had become a member
of GATT. Effected by an exchange of notes at Ankara, July 5, 1952. Termina-
tion to be effective on 30th day following date of note. Id. at 179, 268.
(6) Industrial Controls Agreement, United States, United Kingdom,
France, replaces agreement signed April, 1949. 24 Dep't State Bull. 621(1951).
(7) Greenland, Defense Agreement with Denmark signed April 27, 1951.
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On entry into force, Agreement of April 9, 1941, shall cease to be in force,
Art. XII. Id. at 814, 943.
(8) Trade Agreement with Costa Rica signed Nov. 28, 1936, and termi-
nated by an exchange of notes dated April 3, 1951. Agreement to cease to be
in force after June 1, 1951, by mutual consent Id. at 622.
(9) As a result of Sweden's accession to GATT, an agreement was
signed on May 25, 1950, by which the 1935 trade agreement was terminated,
effective June 30, 1950. Id. at 624.
(10) Copyright Extension Agreement, United States-United Kingdom
signed March 10, 1944. Cancelled by an exchange of notes of July 26, 1950.
Termination was effective Dec. 29, 1950. 23 Dep't State Bull. 388 (1950).
(11) Reciprocal Trade Agreement with Mexico of 1942, terminated by
an exchange of notes dated about June 23, 1950, and will cease to be in force
on Dec. 30, 1950. Terminated only after long and mutually cooperative nego-
tiations. Id. at 215, 501.
(12) Trade Agreement with Haiti Superceded as of Jan. 1, 1950,
through operation of agreement under GATT. 22 Dep't State Bull. 30 (1950).
(13) Trade Agreement with Columbia of Sept. 13, 1935, by exchange of
notes released on Oct. 17, 1949. Mutual consent. Will cease to be in force
after Dec. 1, 1949. 21 Dep't State Bull. 711 (1949).
(14) Trade Agreement with Brazil, 1935. All provisions of the agreement
were made inoperative except Art. XIV relating to termination upon six
months' notice so long as the United States and Brazil are both members of
GATT. Effected by an exchange of notes. Concluded June 30, 1948. 19 Dep't
State Bull. 211 (1948).
(15) On Dec. 4, 1947, the President issued proclamation No. 2763,
12 Fed. Reg. 8866 (1947), declaring to be inoperative all provisions except
those relating to termination on six months' notice of the trade agreement with
respect to which it was issued-trade agreements with certain countries where
such agreements conflicted with GATT, Belgo-Luxumbourg Economic Union,
France, Netherlands, and Great Britain. 18 Dep't State Bull. 30 (1948).
(16) Termination of Commercial Aviation Treaty with Cuba, 1928,
in accordance with Article XXXVII of the treaty (T.S. 840) and in com-
pliance with Article LXXX of the Convention of Civil Aviation (T.I.A.S.
1591). 17 Dep't State Bull. 599 (1947).(17) Termination of Fox Fur Quota Agreement of 1940 as supplemented
by an exchange of notes agreeing to supplementary trade agreement of Jan. 1,
1940, and later agreement replacing first of Dec. 20, 1940. Termination in
accordance with terms by exchange of notes effective May 1, 1947. 16 Dep't
State Bull. 678 (1947).
(18) Termination effective Oct. 29, 1946, of Agreement with Peru for
El Pato Airbase of April 24, 1942, in accordance with termination clause.
15 Dep't State Bull. 866 (1946).
(19) Denunciation on July 25, 1946, by United States of Five Freedoms
Agreement formulated at Chicago in 1944. Withdrawal is in accordance with
Article V of the Agreement which requires ratification of all contracting
parties. Id. at 236.(20) Termination of 1941 Defense Agreement with Iceland effected by
an exchange of notes, Sept. 19, 1946, which constituted a new agreement
Id. at 583.(21) Termination of Coffee Price Control Agreement with Brazil was
brought about by decontrol of coffee prices on Oct 17, 1946. Memo of
Understanding was to endure until March 31, 1947, or as long as coffee was
subject to price control, which ever was the shorter period. Id. at 872.(22) Rubber agreement between the United States, Argentina, and Brazil
(T.I.A.S. 1542). Cancellation dated May 2, 1945. Effected by an exchange
of notes. Id. at 514, 827.
(23) Expiration of Agreement signed on Ncv. 28, 1944, between the
United States and Portugal for airfield in Azores. Expired on June 2, 1946.
Agreement provided for termination six months after end of hostilities or
armistice with period of three months grace for removal of forces and ma-
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an international agreement by the United States. The general prac-
tice has been to bring about the termination by an exchange of
notes in which the agreement to terminate is set forth.8
In 1951, the Congress passed an act extending the Reciprocal
Trade Act,9 section 5 of which instructed the President to abolish
agreements containing trade concessions to all countries in the com-
munist bloc. Most of the agreements concerned were executive
agreements; but two, those with Poland10 and Hugary,11 were
treaties. The presidential response to the congressional direction
2
demonstrates rather conclusively that the United States treats
executive agreements and treaties in precisely the same manner
terial by the United States. Effected by an exchange of notes bringing the
agreement to an end. 14 Dep't State Bull. 1051, 1080 (1946).(24) United States, Haiti, exchange of notes dated Sept. 9, and 16, 1944,
confirming automatic termination of certain agreements between the United
States and Haiti upon termination of the Haiti-Dominican Republic com-
mercial treaty of Aug. 26, 1941. 11 Dep't State Bull. 394 (1944).
(25) United Maritime Authority Agreement of Aug. 5, 1944 (T.I.A.S.
1722), terminated March 2, 1946, by Agreement under paragraph 9. 14 Dep't
State Bull. 487 (1946).
(26) Protocol on the Inter-American Registration of Trade Marks of
Feb. 20, 1929 (T.S. 833), denounced by United States in accordance with
Art. XIX, para. 3 of the Protocol on Sept. 29, 1944, by a letter to the Director
General of the Pan American Union. 11 Dep't State Bull. 442 (1944).
(27) Relinquishment of Extraterritoriality with China by treaty of Jan.
11, 1943 (57 Stat. 767, T.S. 984). 7 Dep't State Bull. 805, 839, 854 (1942).
(28) The State Department announced that the United States considers
itself released from requirements contained in para. (a), and (b) of the tax
convention with Canada signed Dec. 30, 1936, by reason of the fact that
Canada on April 30, 1941, raised the rates on non-resident Americans, en-
titling the United States, under the provisions of the Convention to regard
these paragraphs as of that date. 4 Dep't State Bull. 546 (1941).
(29) Announcement of suspension of Parcel Post Agreements with cer-
tain foreign countries because of the disruption of transportation facilities.
2 Dep't State Bull. 720 (1940).
(30) Termination of Agreement for Reciprocal waiver of visa fees with
Belgium. Termination effective March 9, 1940. Agreement signed April 15,
1927. Id. at 332.
8. In 1941, the President took the very unusual step of invoking the
doctrine of -rebus sic stantibus as justification for a proclamation (Proc. Fed.
Reg. 3999) suspended the United States' obligations under the International
Loadline Convention of July 5, 1930 (T.S. 858). The presidential proclama-
tion was based on an opinion by the Attorney General, 40 Ops. Att'y Gen.
119 (1941). For comment, see Briggs, The Attorney General Invokes Rebus
Sic Stantibus, 36 Am. J. Int!l L. 89 (1942).
9. 65 Stat. 72 (1951).
10. Poland, 44 Stat. 1507 (1948), T.S. 862.
11. Hungary, 44 Stat. 2441 (1948), T.S. 748.
12. The presidential proclamation read in part as follows: "Whereas
an important element in determining when it may be practicable to apply
these provisions to particular articles is the ability to do so consistently with
the international obligations of the United States;
Whereas, in giving effect to the procedures available to free the United
States from international obligations existing with respect to some of the
nations and areas covered by the above provisions, it will not be practicable
to apply such provisions to all such nations and areas at the same time."
See Proc. No. 2935, 16 Fed. Reg. 7635 (1951).
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when effecting their termination. Every agreement included within
the scope of the congressional act was terminated in accordance
with the letter of the agreement irrespective of whether it was
labeled "treaty"-or "executive agreement."' 3
Although the rules of international law :or the termination of
executive agreements are identical with the rules of international
law for the termination of treaties, there are discernible distinctions
in the municipal law of the United States with respect to this prob-
lem. Just as there is no provision in the Constitution with respect
to the removal of officials appointed by the President "by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate,"' 4 there is no provision in
the Constitution for the termination of treaties which have been
made "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate."' 5 The
answer to the former question seems to have been settled by practice
confirmed by the Myers case"s as modified by the Humphrey case.' 7
The Myers case presented the Supreme Court for the first time
with the question "whether under the Constitution the President
has the exclusive power of removing executive officers of the United
States whom he has appointed by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate."' 8 In 1917, President Wilson appointed Frank S.
Myers "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate" to be
a first class postmaster for a four-year term. The law under which
the appointment was made expressly provided: "Postmasters of the
first, second, and third classes shall be appointed and may be re-
moved by the President by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate and shall hold their offices for four years unless sooner
removed or suspended according to law."' 9 In 1920, prior to the
expiration of the four-year term, President Wilson requested the
resignation of Myers; and when Myers refused to tender his resig-
nation, the Postmaster General, contrary to the provisions of the
law, pursuant to the order of President Wilson, removed Myers
from his office. Myers protested his removal and, upon expiration of
the term for which he had been appointed, brought suit in the
Court of Claims to recover the salary allegedly due him for the
unexpired portion of his term. The Court of Claims decided against
Myers. Myers died, but his wife and administrix, Lois C. Myers,
13. See 25 Dep't State Bull. 95, 914 (1951); 26 Dep't State Bull.
946 (1952).14. U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2.
15. Ibid.
16. Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (126).
17. Humphrey v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
18. 272 U.S. 52, 106 (1926).
19. 19 Stat 80, 81c (1876).
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appealed to the Supreme Court. In a sweeping opinion, Chief Justice
William H. Taft, who had previously rejected a broad interpretation
of presidential power,20 held the president's power to remove officers
appointed by him "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate"
to be complete. 2
Addressing himself to the specific provision of the Constitution
in question, the Chief Justice said, ".... The executive power was
given in general terms, strengthened by specific terms where empha-
sis was regarded as appropriate, and was limited by direct expres-
sions where limitation was needed, and the fact that no expressed
limit was placed on the power of removal by the Executive was con-
vincing indication that none was intended."2 2 After delineating be-
tween the effect of a Senate veto on the appointing power and a
Senate veto on the removal power,22 Taft asserted that such limita-
tion was "not to be implied. ' 24 In order to sustain his position, the
Chief Justice continued:
The power of removal is incident to the power of appointment
... and when the grant of the executive power is enforced by the
express mandate to take care that the laws be faithfully executed,
it emphasizes the necessity for including within the executive
power ... the exclusive power of removal.
2 5
Doubtless drawing upon his own experience as President of the
United States, Chief Justice Taft proceeded to affirm in the Presi-
dent the power to remove all officials appointed by him irrespective
of their functions. With respect to the removal of the most important
presidential subordinates, the Chief Justice said:
[I]n all such cases, the discretion to be exercised is that of the
President in determining the national public interest and in
directing the action to be taken by his... subordinates to protect
it. In this field his cabinet officers must do his will. He must
place in each member of his official family, and his chief execu-
tive subordinates, implicit faith. The moment he loses con-
fidence in the intelligence, ability, judgment, or loyalty of any
20. In 1916, ex-president Taft had written, "The true view of the
executive functions is, as I conceive it, that the President can exercise no
power which cannot be fairly and reasonably traced to some specific grant
of power or justly implied and included within such express grant as proper
and necessary... ." See Taft, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers, 139,
cited in Corwin, The President Office and Powers, 1787-1948; History and
Analysis of Practice and Opinion, 208 (3rd ed. 1948).
21. For a detailed statement of the facts of this case, see 272 U.S. 52,
106 (1926).
22. Id. at 118.
23. Id. at 121-122.
24. Id. at 121.
25. Id. at 122.
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one of them, he must have the power to remove him without
delay.26
Continuing this line of reasoning, the Chief Justice promptly
extended the scope of his assertion by holding, "The imperative
reasons requiring an unrestricted power to remove the most impor-
tant of his subordinates in their most important duties must, there-
fore, control the interpretation of the Constitution as to all appointed
by him."127 In a further elaboration of this statement, he specifically
included within the scope of his opinion those executive officers who
perform duties of a "quasi judicial character." 28 The Tenure of
Office Act was declared by the Chief justice to be unconstitutional,
and the President was seemingly vested with an uncontrolled power
of removal.
The opinion of the Chief Justice had clearly ranged beyond the
question before the Court, that is, the removal of a first class post-
master, and in 1935, in the case of Humphrey's Executor, Rathbun
v. United States,29 the Court refused to acquiesce in the opinion of
Chief Justice Taft and expressly repudiated that portion of the
opinion which related to the removal of officials appointed by the
President "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate" but
whose duties were described as "quasi judicial or quasi legislative."
The facts of the case may be stated briefly.30 William E. Hum-
phrey was appointed in 1931 by President Hoover "by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate" to be a member of the Federal
Trade Commission for a term of seven years. In 1933, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt asked for Mr. Humphrey's resignation.
Humphrey refused to resign, whereupon President Roosevelt re-
moved him from office. Humphrey refused to acquiesce in his sum-
mary removal and continued to assert his right to the office. Follow-
ing Mr. Humphrey's death in 1934, a suit was pressed in the Court
of Claims by his executor to recover the salary due him from the
date of his removal until the date of his death.
The Act of February 13, 1925, under which the appointment
had been made provided that "any commissioner may be removed
by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
office.'231
26. Id. at 134.
27. Ibid.
28. Id. at 135.
29. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
30. For a complete statement of the facts, see 295 U.S. 602, 618-619
(1935).
31. 43 Stat. 936, 939 (1925).
1958]
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After examining the legislative history of the act and the motives
of Congress in prescribing the seven-year term for members of the
Commission, the Court concluded that Congress had intended to
limit the presidential power of removal by prescribing a specific
term of office and limiting the power of removal to the causes
enumerated.
In rendering a decision upon the constitutionality of the act as
thus interpreted, the Court was obliged to distinguish the Myers
case. Mr. justice Sutherland, speaking for the Court, said:
The office of postmaster is so essentially unlike the office now
involved that the decision in the Myers case cannot be accepted
as controlling our decision here. A postmaster is an executive
officer restricted in the performance of executive functions ...
the necessary reach of the decision goes far enough to include
all purely executive officers. It goes no farther; much less does it
include an officer who occupies no place in the executive depart-
ment and who exercises no part of the executive power vested
by the Constitution in the President.
The Federal Trade Commission is an administrative body
created by Congress to carry into effect legislative policies em-
bodied in the statute in accordance with the legislative standard
therein prescribed, and to perform other specified duties as a
legislative or as a judicial aid .... 12
The Court observed that to admit the power of the President to
remove the members of the Federal Trade Commission would re-
quire a similar exercise of power with respect to the Interstate Com-
merce Commission and the Court of Claims.3 The Court proceeded
to hold that "under the Constitution that illimitable power of re-
moval is not possessed by the President with respect of officers of
the character of those just named."8' 4 The Court summarized its
opinion as follows:
The result of what we now have said is this: Whether the power
of the President to remove an officer shall prevail over the
authority of Congress to condition the power by fixing a definite
term precluding a removal except for cause, will depend upon the
character of the office; the Myers decision, affirming the power
of the President alone to make the removal, is confined to purely
executive officers; and as to officers of the kind here under con-
sideration, we hold that no removal can be made during the pre-
scribed term for which the officer is appointed, except for one
or more of the causes named in the applicable statute.3 5
32. 295 U.S. 602, 627 (1935).
33. Id. at 629.
34. Ibid.
35. Id. at 631.
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Therefore, insofar as the removal of purely executive officers is
concerned, the broad scope of presidential removal power as ex-
pounded by Chief Justice Taft in the Myers case was left undis-
turbed. Inasmuch as the making of treaties pertains to the conduct
of foreign relations, distinctly an executive power, much of Chief
Justice Taft's argument in Myers can be applied with equal cogency
to support an unlimited power of treaty termination by the Presi-
dent.
In the course of his opinion, the Chief Justice asserted:
Made responsible under the Constitution for the effective en-
forcement of the law, the President needs as an indispensable
aid to meet it the disciplinary influence upon those who act under
him of a reserve power of removal.3 6
The conduct of foreign relations, like the duty to see that the
laws are faithfully executed, is a plenary executive power. The
power of the President to make treaties, like his power to make
appointments, was expressly limited in the Constitution by the pro-
vision that he must first obtain the advice and consent of the
Senate.17 These are express limitations upon what otherwise appear
to be executive powers. In the absence of express limitations upon
the power to remove and the power to terminate, there is a strong
presumption that no such limitation was intended.
Moreover, while the termination of a treaty is not a disciplinary
measure, the termination or threat of termination of a treaty may on
occasion by indispensable to the conduct of the foreign relations of
the nation. As the sole organ of foreign relations, 3 the President
has more sources of information at his disposal and is in a better
position than any other official or agency of the government to make
the final decision with respect to the continuance in force or the
termination of any treaty.
As noted by the Court, the reason which prompted the placing
of the restriction upon the President's power of appointment was to
protect the small states against the large states by insuring that
citizens of the smaller states would have a role in the operation of
the administrative branch of the government.3 9 State interests also
prompted the adoption of the two-thirds rule with respect to treaty-
making.40 The termination of a treaty or the removal of an official
36. 272 U.S. 52, 132 (1926).
37. U.S. Const art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2.
38. United States v. Curtiss Wright Export. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319(1936).
39. 272 U.S. 52, 119 (1926).
40. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., on H.J. Res. 6, 31, 64, 238, 246, 264, 320(1944).
19581
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from office may be of vital interest to the President in insuring the
enforcement of the laws or in the conduct of foreign relations; but
insofar as protecting the rights of the several states is concerned, the
powers of termination or removal are essentially negative in char-
acter.4 1 Therefore, the reasons for the limitations on the power to
"cappoint" officials and the power to "make" treaties do not apply
with equal cogency to the removal of an official from office or to the
termination of a treaty.
Nevertheless, the President has never been accorded an exclu-
sive power to terminate treaties. Practice and opinion in the United
States also supports the view that treaties should be terminated as
they are made, i.e., by the President and the Senate acting as the
"treaty-making" power of the United States.42
Although this theory has some merits, careful comparison to the
appointing power and especially to the reasoning of the Supreme
Court in the Myers case detracts from its cogency. If the President's
power to terminate a treaty were made dependent upon the approval
of two-thirds of the Senate, he could not discharge his constitutional
responsibilities as the principal diplomatic officer of the nation
without the constant threat of senatorial interference and consequent
delay and embarrassment.
On the other hand, the provisions of a treaty become the supreme
law of the land, and good theoretical arguments can be advanced for
denying to the President alone the power to alter the law since,
under the Constitution, the law making power is vested in the legis-
lative branch of the government. Moreover, the Congress has the
undisputed right to repeal the provisions of a treaty and thereby to
destroy its effective internal enforcement. A case for congressional
initiation of the termination can be made on the ground that the
Congress should, in the anticipation of breaching the treaty by
passing conflicting legislation, call upon the President to terminate
the treaty in order to avoid an international delinquency.
These propositions are presented in order to demonstrate that
any of the five possible methods for terminating a treaty involve
constitutional difficulties. There is perhaps no better example of the
dilemma resulting from the operation of the "checks and balances"
of the Constitution. The five possible combinations which theoreti-
cally can be used to bring about the termination of a treaty are: (1)
41. 272 U.S. 52, 121 (1926).
42. See Riesenfeld, The Power of the Congress and the President in
International Relations; Three Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 25 Calif. L.
Rev. 660 (1947) ; Hack-vorth, op. cit. supra note 3, at 319; McDougal and
Lans, supra note 2, at 337.
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the President acting alone, (2) initiation by the President with the
approval of the Senate, (3) initiation by the President with the
approval of the Congress, (4) initiation by the Senate with the
acquiescence of the President, and (5) initiation by the Congress
with the acquiescence of the President. As a matter of fact, all five
of these combinations have at one time or another in the history of
the country been employed to bring about the termination of a
treaty. 3 Furthermore, there has never been any court decision hold-
ing any one of the five to be the constitutional method for bringing
about the termination of a treaty.44 The varied practice and the
complete silence of the Constitution with respect to the matter of
termination would seemingly relegate this problem to the realm of
"the political question," i.e., a declaration by the Court that the
question presented must be decided by the political branches of the
government to the exclusion of the judicial branch. In the past, the
Court has demonstrated a marked restraint in deciding cases involv-
ing the foreign relations power and has frequently avoided the issue
by invoking the doctrine of the "political question. '45
The lack of a settled procedure may occasionally lead to political
impasses in the future as it has in the past.4 6 The nature of the con-
stitutional grants of power, however, generally places either the
President or Congress in the dominant position. In such cases the
power of the body in the less advantageous position amounts to no
more than that of verbal protest. Therefore, if the system is to work
smoothly, the so-called "constitutional understandings" of Professor
Quincy Wright4 7 must be invoked in order to avoid the built-in
43. See Wright, The Control of American Foreign Relations 258(1922) ; McClure, International Executive Agreements, Democratic Pro-
cedure Under the Constitution of the United States 16 (1941) ; Hackworth,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 319-333; Riesenfeld, supra note 42, at 643; McDougal
and Lans, supra note 2, at 334-337.
44. In 1936, the Supreme Court sanctioned the termination of a treaty
by the President pursuant to the direction of the Congress, but the Court
avoided a definative discussion of the power of termination. See Van Der
Weyde v. Ocean Trans. Co., 297 U.S. 114 (1936).
45. See., e.g., Doe v. Braden, 16 How. 635 (1853) ; Terlinden v. Ames,
184 U.S. 270 (1902) ; Chicago and Southern Airlines v. Waterman Steamship
Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
46. See McClure's account of President Wilson's refusal to acquiesce
in the congressional directive contained in section 34 of the Merchant Marine
Act of 1920 (41 Stat. 988, 1007). McClure, op. cit. supra note 43, at 23;
see also Hackworth, op. cit. supra note 3, at 323.
47. Professor Wright explained his theory as follows: "The constitu-
tional understandings are based on the distinction between the possession o
a power and discretion in the exercise of that power. The law of the con
stitution decides what organs of the government possess the power to perforr
acts of international significance and to make valid international commit-
ments, but the understandings of the constitution decide how the discretion
of judgment implied from the possession of power ought to be exercised in
1958]
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"invitation to struggle" suggested by Professor E. S. Corwin.18
Many terminations, of course, leave no room for disagreement
among the President, Senate, and Congress. In a case where: (1)
the treaty expires in accordance with its terms, (2) the object of
the treaty has been accomplished, or (3) the termination procedure
is initiated by the other party to the treaty, the transaction seemingly
falls within the routine diplomatic business of the President and the
Department of State. The question of the extinguishment or con-
tinued existence of a state party to a treaty appears to be a matter for
executive determination.49 The determination as to whether a treaty
should be terminated by reason of breach by the other party is also
a matter of presidential discretion ;50 but this is a question which
invites conflict between the executive and other interested political
organs. The policy determination as to whether an effective treaty
ought to be terminated is also a question which can lead to conflict
between the political organs of the government.5 1
Where conflict does result between the President and Senate
or between the President and the Congress over the termination
of a treaty, it is interesting to note the relative power position of each
organ.
If the President decides that a treaty has been terminated or
decides to terminate a treaty, there is no way open to the Senate
or the Congress to thwart him. He could conceivably be impeached;
but the threat of impeachment, while ever a possibility, is not
deemed to be an effective check upon the President except where
acts of the utmost gravity are involved. Furthermore, once the Presi-
dent has delivered the notice of termination, there is no power which
could recall that notice.52 Nor is it within the power of the other
given circumstances. The powers given by law to various organs often over-
lap. Even more often, two or more organs must exercise their powers in
cooperation in order to achieve a desired end. In such circumstances, were
it not for understandings, deadlocks would be chronic. The law is the mech-
anism, the understandings the oil that permit it to run smoothly." Wright,
op. cit. supra note 43, at 8.
48. Professor Corwin has stated, "What the Constituion does, and all
that it does, is to confer upon the President certain powers capable of affecting
our foreign relations, and certain other powers of the same general nature
upon the Senate, and still other such powers upon Congress; but which of
these organs shall have the decisive and final voice in determining the course
of the American nation is left for events to resolve.
All of which amounts to saying that the Constitution, considered only
for its affirmative grants of powers which are capable of affective the issue,
is an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign
policy." Corwin, op. cit. supra note 20, at 208.
49. Latvian States S.S. and Cargo Line v. McGrath, 188 F.2d 1000(D.C. Cir. 1951) ; The Maret, 145 F.2d 431 (3rd Cir. 1944).
50. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 476 (1913).
51. See discussion of Yalta Agreement, p .... infra.
52. See Hackworth, op. cit. mipra note 3, at 199.
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contracting party to question the constitutional validity of his action.
If, on the contrary, the President voluntarily subjects his action
to the approval of the Senate or the Congress, he thereby modifies
his power to that degree in the interest of national unity. If the
approval is granted, he strengthens his power position vis-a-vis the
other contracting party. Moreover, it must always be remembered
that the President's constitutional power to act is curtailed by politi-
cal considerations. No President can long determine national policy
without the support of Congress and party."
The President may act boldly when he is assured that he has the
support of the Congress for his policy. He may act reasonably
boldly when the Congress is divided and has no policy. He must
act with extreme circumspection, however, when his policy is clearly
at variance with a discernible congressional policy.54 Therefore, he
probably would not terminate a treaty on his own initiative in the
face of overt hostility of the Congress nor would he ask the consent
of the Senate or the Congress to such termination unless he were
reasonably certain that he would not be embarrassed by a negative
answer.
If the President has constitutional power which may on occasion
give him the upper hand over the Senate and the Congress, the
Congress likewise has power which can be exercised in such a
way as to embarrass the President in the conduct of the foreign
relations of the nation. From a standpoint of sheer power, the
Congress can refuse to implement a treatyi which has been con-
cluded by the President and Senate. In the face of Congressional
inaction, the President could only undertake the very embarrassing
task of extricating the nation from its international obligation. He
could not force the Congress to act. This is another instance, how-
ever, where power is more theoretical that real. The Congress is
fully aware of the nature of the national obligations under inter-
national law. The degree to which the realities of this situation have
53. On this point, Professor Corwin asserts, "But whatever emphasis
be given the President's role as 'sole organ of foreign relations' and the
initiative thereby conferred upon him in this field, the fact remains that no
presidentially devised diplomatic policy can long survive without the support
of Congress, the body to which belongs the power to lay and collect taxes
for the common defense, to regulate foreign commerce, to create armies and
maintain navies, to pledge the credit of the United States, to declare war,
to define offenses against the law of nations, and to make 'all laws which
shall be necessary and proper' for carrying into execution not only its own
powers, but all the powers 'of the Government of the United States and
of any department or officer thereof." Corwin, op. cit. mupra note 20, at
224-225.
54. Cf. Jackson, J., in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 635 (1952).
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been acquiesced in by the Congress is revealed by the fact that
despite occasional protests, the Congress has never refused to make
the appropriations necessary for the implementation of a treaty.35
Similarly, the Congress may enact conflicting legislation and
thus destroy the internal effect of a treaty. 6 The Presiderit may
veto5 7 such legislation or he may remonstrate with the Congress to
reconsider its action"" in order to protect the good faith of the
United States. If the Congress remains adamant, his only course of
action is to bring about the international termination of the treaty.
The President could, of course, refuse to take steps to terminate the
treaty, but in such case presidential recalcitrance would only prolong
the international delinquency. 59 Therefore, where a difference of
opinion between the President and Congress occurs, the presidential
power to speak for the nation in the field of foreign relations is not
without limit.
Of the three organs, the Senate would appear to be in the
weakest position. 60 If the President requests its participation, it may
refuse; but the Senate has no way of forcing the President's hand
as does the Congress. The Senate, or for that matter, the House of
Representatives, may, through a Senate or House resolution, call
upon the President to bring about the termination of a treaty. Such
action is not binding upon the President, and he may comply with
or ignore the resolution as he sees fit. The President may likewise
heed or ignore a concurrent resolution of the two Houses.
A slightly different problem is posed when the Congress in-
structs the President in the provisions of a duly enacted statute to
55. Se Hackworth, op. cit. supra note 3, at 199.
56. See Taylor v. Morton, 23 Fed. Cas. 799 (1855); The Cherokee
Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616 (1871); Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases),
112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884).
57. For an account of the veto by President Hays in 1879 of an act
passed by the Congress which required the President to give notice to China
of the abrogation of Articles V and VI of the Burlingame Treaty, see Hack-
worth, op. cit. supra note 3, at 324.
58. See the account of President Wilson's handling of the Panama
Canal tolls dispute in Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People
599 (1940).
59. Conflict between the provisions of the Universal Service and Train-
ing Act of 1951 (65 Stat 75 (1951), 50 U.S.C. § 451ff.), and Article VI
of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights with Germany
(44 Stat. 2132, (1927), T.S. 725) made necessary the cancellation of the
treaty provision. See exchange of notes signed June 2, 1953, T.I.A.S. 2972.
60. In a recent treaty, the Statue of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, the Senate sought to strengthen its position in this respect by at-
taching an understanding to its resolution of ratification providing the United
States would terminate its treaty relationship should an amendment to the
statute be adopted of which the Senate did not approve. See 103 Cong. Rec.
8453 (text of statute), 8463 (text of understanding), 8534 (final adoption
(daily ed. June 18, 1957).
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bring about the termination of designated international agreements.
By the terms of the Constitution, the President is directed to "take
care that the laws be faithfully executed" ;61 and in the normal
course of events, he can be expected to abide by the letter and the
spirit of the Constitution.62 Whatever the theoretical legal consider-
ations, there is no constitutional or other governmental machinery
short of impeachment whereby the President could be forced to obey
the statute. Given the inherent possibility of conflict which is written
into the constitutional system, there is no wonder that an occasional
deadlock has occurred between the President and the Congress or
the Senate with respect to the termination of this or that treaty. The
wonder is that such deadlocks have been so few.
The discussion of the termination of executive agreements is
somewhat simplified by the fact that the Senate has no separate role
to play. The agencies concerned are the President and the Congress.
As a matter of fact, the termination of executive agreements appears
to have been vested by practice in the President, or the President
and Congress acting jointly. There is no evidence of controversy
on the point. The President, of course, as the organ of foreign re-
lations, is the only organ of the government which can bring about
the definitive termination of the international commitment.
The Congress, however, has adopted a neat formula for guaran-
teeing the retention of legislative control over agreements concluded
under the color of an authorizing statute. In what now appears to
be a uniform practice, the Congress inserts a provision in the
statute which provides that the program may be cancelled by a con-
current resolution of the two Houses of the Congress.8 Thus, while
in theory the President has been granted sweeping powers under
such acts as the Lend-Lease Act, 64 the Econcmic Cooperation Act,65
and the Mutual Defense Act,68 the Congress has in every instance
retained the final control in its own hands. Some statutes have also
set forth specific contingencies upon which the President may termi-
nate any agreement.8 These provisions could conceivably be inter-
61. U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 3.
62. See the statement of the Supreme Court in Van Der Weyde v.
Ocean Transport Co., 297 U.S. 114, 117-118 (1936).
63. See, e.g., E.C.A. Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 137, 155 sec. 122(a) (1948);
Act to Provide for Assistance to Greece and Turkey, 61 Stat. 103, sec. 6
(1947); Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 714, sec. 405(d)
1949) ; Lend-Lease Act of 1941, 55 Stat. 31, sec. 3(c) (1941).
64. 55 Stat. 31 (1941).
65. 62 Stat. 137 (1948).
66. 63 Stat. 714 (1949).
67. See, e.g., An Act to Provide for Assistance to Greece and Turkey,
61 Stat. 103, sec. 5 (1947) ; Mutual Defense Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 714, 718,
sec. 405 (1949) ; Mutual Security Act of 1951, 65 Stat 373, sec. 529; Foreign
Aid Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 934, sec. 6 (1947).
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preted to mean that the causes specified by the Congress were the
only grounds upon which the President could cancel an agreement;
however, such an interpretation appears to rob the procedure of its
flexibility and to circumscribe too closely the President's power to
conduct foreign affairs.
The most unusual provision relating to termination found in an
authorizing statute appears in Section 118 of the Economic Coopera-
tion Act of 1948.68 The Congress vested the Administrator with
power to terminate assistance to any country participating in the
program should he determine that such country had committed any
of certain acts specified in the law. Termination of the assistance
would in fact mean termination of the agreement. Therefore, the
Congress conferred upon the Administrator the power to terminate
an agreement or agreements, the negotiation of which had been
assigned to the Secretary of State after consultation with the Ad-
ministrator. 9 This provision is especially conspicuous because in
every other act the analogous provisions of the several authorizing
acts place the power to terminate in the President. The provision is
all the more interesting since there may well be some question as to
whether the Administrator was intended to be an agent of the Presi-
dent or of the Congress. As in the other statutes, however, the
Congress retained the right to terminate the program by passage
of a concurrent resolution.7 0 In addition, Congress may repeal the
authorizing or approving legislation where such agreements have
been authorized or approved by the Congress. Similarly, the Con-
gress may pass a conflicting statute or refuse to provide funds
necessary for the continued implementation of an agreement. Where
the action by the Congress is positive, the President may use the
veto to thwart legislation which he considers improper. In the case
of a refusal to act in the matter of appropriation of funds for ex-
ample, the President must yield, for he has no power with which to
force the Congress to act. Many of the executive agreements to
which the United States is a party recognize the power of Congress
to render them ineffective by making specific provisions for termina-
tion in the event Congress should fail to make the necessary appro-
priations or should pass contrary legislation.7' The inclusion of such
68. 62 Stat 137 (1948).
69. 62 Stat. 150, 151, sec. 115 (1948).
70. 62 Stat. 155, sec. 122(a) (1948).
71. See, e.g., Article X of the Fur Seals Agreement with Canada
effected by an exchange of notes between the United States and Canada dated
December 8 and 19, 1942 (58 Stat. 1379, E.A.S. 415) ; Article I of the Mutual
Defense Agreement with France signed Jan. 27, 1950 (T.I.A.S. 2012,
1 U.S.T. 34); Article I of the E.C.A. Agreement with Portugal signed
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provisions is very desirable, most especially with respect to appro-
priations. The other contracting party must, of course, be granted
reciprocal rights, but such an escape clause obviates the possibility
of an international delinquency by the United States. Moreover,
there is no evidence to indicate that the inclusion of such provisions
has resulted in careless or arbitrary terminations by either party.
Although numerous bills and resolutions are introduced at every
session of the Congress which indicate a disregard by individual Con-
gressmen for the doctrine of the separation of powers, only on rare oc-
casions does either House of the Congress act favorably upon a resolu-
tion which encroaches upon presidential prerogative in the field of for-
eign relations.7 2 The reluctance of the Congress to take the definitive
step to bring about the abrogation of an agreenent in the face of presi-
dential opposition is nowhere better demonstrated than in the
maneuvering which took place during the 83d Congress over the
Yalta Agreement. Some members of the Congress were eager to
repudiate the Agreement. The President, however, was unwilling
to go further than to support an interpretive resolution.73 Appar-
ently, neither solution was attractive enough to a sufficient number
of Congressmen to bring about its adoption. As a result the move-
ment collapsed and the Yalta Agreement was left undisturbed.
By far the most significant recent action taken by the Congress
to bring about the termination of a number of international agree-
Sept. 28, 1948) (62 Stat (3) 2856, T.I.A.S. 1819) ; Article XVIII of Agree-
ment for a Cooperative Program of Agriculture with Honduras signed Jan.
30, 1951 (T.I.A.S. 2209, 2 U.S.T. (1) 577) ; Agreement with Ecuador for the
establishment of an agricultural experiment station in Ecuador effected by an
exchange of notes signed Oct. 20 and 29, 1942 (56 Stat. 1787, E.A.S. 284).
72. House Joint Resolution 111 introduced by Rep. Thaddeus M. Mach-
rowicz (D., Mich.) on Jan. 9, 1953, declaring that the Yalta Agreement is no
longer binding upon the United States; H. J. Res. 162 introduced by Rep.
Charles S. Kersten (R., Wis.) on Feb. 2, 1953, declaring the Yalta Agreement
to be null and void and not binding upon the United States; H. C. Res. 13
introduced by Rep. Lawrence Smith (R., Wis.) on Jan. 3, 1953, declaring it
to be the sense of the Congress of the United States that the private agree-
ments concluded in 1945 at Yalta and Potsdam should be forthwith repudiated
by the United States; H. C. Res. 22 introduced by Rep. Albert H. Bosch(R., N.Y.) on Jan. 16, 1953, declaring it to be the sense of the Congress that
the text of the agreements private or otherwise concluded in 1945 at Yalta
and Potsdam should be forthwith made public and re-examined to the end that
a basis shall be found to accomplish the universal desire of all the people of
the United States, to wit, a just and equitable peace; H. C. Res. 68 intro-
duced by Rep. Alvin M. Bentley (R., Mich.) on Feb. 18, 1953, declaring it to
be the sense of the Congress that certain provision!; of the Yalta Agreement
not be recognized by the United States.
73. See speech of President Eisenhower before the Congress on Febru-
ary 2, 1953. 99 Cong. Rec. 1344 (1953). See also the message of President
Eisenhower to the President of the Senate, the Honorable Richard M. Nixon,
dated Feb. 20, 1953, id. at 1344.
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ments-both treaties and executive agreements-is to be found in
the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951. 74 Since President
Truman acted with alacrity 5 to comply with the congressional direc-
tive, no disagreement ensued.
Except for the more active role of the Senate in the termination
of treaties, the termination of treaties and executive agreements is
accomplished through virtually the same procedure.78 As a matter
of practice, the President has played a more active independent role
in the termination of executive agreements. This is undoubtedly due
in part to the fact that there are many more executive agreements
than treaties and due in part also to the fact that many executive
agreements are concluded by the President pursuant to his own
constitutional powers. Certainly the procedures used for bringing
about the termination of the treaty and the executive agreement
cannot be used as a general rule for distinguishing the one from
the other.
One of the interesting and unanswered questions in our constitu-
tional law is one concerning the validity of a statute dealing with a
subject outside the national jurisdiction after the treaty which it
had been passed to implement has been terminated. The question has
never arisen in the courts and has seldom been discussed by com-
mentators. Nevertheless, there is a real possibility that the question
will one day come before the courts. Since the justification for the
legislation is to be found in the international obligation, it would
seem to follow that when the international obligation is terminated,
the raison d'etre of the legislation would likewise terminate. At the
precise moment of the termination of the treaty, the subject matter
would cease to be within the scope of the treaty-making power and
would revert to the states.
A similar, though not precisely analogous, problem is presented
in the case of the repeal of a statute which is the basis for one or
more executive agreements. Does the repeal of the statute automati-
cally render the agreements inoperative as municipal law? Cer-
74. 65 Stat. c. 141, 72 (1951), provided as follows: "As soon as practical,
the President will take action such as is necessary to suspend, withdraw, or
prevent the application of any reduction in any rate of duty, or finding of any
existing customs or excise treatment, or other concession contained in any
trade agreement entered into under authority of Section 350 of the Tariff
Act of 1930, as amended, and extended to imports from any nation or area
dominated or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization
controlling the world Communist movement."
75. See Proclamation 2935 giving effect to sections 5 and 11 of the Trade
Agreements Extension Act of 1951. 16 Fed. Reg. 7635 (1951).
76. Cf. McDougal and Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive
Agreements or Presidential Agreements, Interchangeable Instruments of
National Policy, 54 Yale L.J. 338 (1945).
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tainly the unilateral act by the United States could not bring about
the international termination of the agreements unless such exigency
had been expressly provided for in the agreement. The agreements
might also be of such nature that their continued operation would be
impossible in the absence of the authorizing statute. Some agree-
ments could continue to operate, however, unless the repeal of the
statute automatically suspended their municipal force.
There are two early precedents bearing directly on this question.
A diplomatic controversy with Brazil resulted when the repeal of
the Tariff Act of 1890 was construed to terminate an executive
agreement concluded under the authority of that Act. In answer to
the Brazilian demand that the agreement continue in force for the
period of time stipulated in the agreement, Secretary of State
Gresham wrote:
The so-called treaties or agreements that were entered into based
on the third section of the McKinley bill were not treaties bind-
ing upon the two Governments, and the present law is manda-
tory. Notice to your Government that the arrangement would
terminate as provided by its terms would have no force, as the
arrangement actually exists no longer.77
An analogous situation occurred in 1909 when the Congress re-
pealed the Tariff Act of 1897 under which several executive agree-
ments had been concluded. The Congress had, with due regard for
international good faith, provided that the agreements would termi-
nate only after six months' notice to the other contracting parties.
An agreement with France which had been concluded under the Act
had been made without any provision for its termination, and France
questioned the right of the United States to act unilaterally to termi-
nate the agreement even subject to six months' notice.
Acting Secretary of State Wilson wrote to the French Charge
d'Affaires Lefevre-Pontailis on August 23, 1909, in part as follows:
These commercial agreements, not being treaties in the constitu-
tional sense, and hence not requiring the concurrence of the
Senate of the United States, but having been negotiated under
the authority of and in accordance with the legislative provisions
contained in section 3 of the tariff act of July 24, 1897, would, in
the absence of enabling legislation by Congress, have been termi-
nated ipso facto on the going into effect of the tariff act of the
United States approved August 5, 1909, which has changed the
77. Foreign Relations of the United States, I, 77 (1894). See letter of
Secretary of State Gresham to Mr. Mendonca, Brazilian Minister, dated Oct.
26, 1894, reprinted in Moore, A Digest of International Law, V, 359 (1906) ;
Wright, op. cit. supra note 43, at 235; McDougal and Lans, supra note 76,
at 349.
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bases on which these agreements were negotiated. In order, how-
ever, to avoid the abrupt termination of these international com-
pacts, the Congress adopted the provisions contained in section
4 of the new tariff act.. . . Inasmuch as the agreements with
France, Switzerland, and Bulgaria contain no stipulations in
regard to their termination by diplomatic action, it was deemed
proper by the Congress of the United States that these agree-
ments should not be terminated abruptly, but should be con-
tinued in force until the expiration of six months from April 30,
1909, the date when the foreign Governments concerned were
formally notified by the Government of the United States of the
intended termination of the commercial agreements under the
Dingley tariff.... As you are aware, the President of the United
States, in giving the formal notices on August 7, 1909, has been
obliged to follow implicitly the prescriptions of the new tariff act
of the United States.78
Where, as in this case, the President has been expressly directed
by the Congress to bring about the termination of the authorized
agreements, he appears to have no alternative but to act, for the
Congress concededly has the power to recall the authority delegated
to the President. If, on the other hand, the Congress should repeal
an authorizing statute without reference to the existing agreement
or agreements and the operation of their provisions were possible
without the supporting legislation, there would appear no bar to the
President's continuing the agreement or agreements in force until
the expiration of the period for which they had been concluded. The
President would, of course, be divested of power to renew the agree-
ment, since such renewal would amount in effect to the conclusion
of a new agreement.
In addressing himself to this very question when testifying
before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Mr. Edward G. Miller,
Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, stated his views as
follows:
I believe that a specific trade agreement entered into under the
Trade Agreements Act, at the time when the Trade Agreements
Act is in full force and effect, continues to be a valid agreement
in accordance with its terms regardless of the expiration of the
underlying Trade Agreements Act; subject, however, to the
right of the Congress, by specific action, to provide that particu-
lar agreement shall be deemed to be no longer in force as to
the United States....'9
The courts have never passed upon this question, but certainly,
78 Cited in Hackworth, op. cit. supra note 3, at 429-30.
79. Hearings Before the Committe on Commerce of the Senate, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess., on S. 1814, at 134 (1946).
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in the absence of expressed intent to the contrary by the Congress, it
is not to be lightly assumed that the Congress intended to expose the
nation to a charge of bad faith where an alternative interpretation
consonant with the principles of international law were possible.
Any discussion of the termination of treaties during the period
under study would be incomplete without some reference to the pro-
visions of the various peace treaties arising out of World War II
with respect to the prewar bilateral treaties between the United
States and the countries concerned. In each treaty, there was in-
cluded a provision which empowered the victorious powers to re-
new or permit to lapse, as they should desire, the bilateral treaties
between the victor and the vanquished.80 In due time, the United
States notified Bulgaria, Italy, Hungary, Rumania, and Japan by
diplomatic notes of the treaties which were to continue in force.
The defeated nations acquiesced in the decision of the United
States in accordance with the obligations assumed in the treaties
of peace."'
The validity of this procedure was challenged early in 1955 in a
federal district court.8 2 Tommaso Argento, who was being held by
the U. S. Marshal for extradition to Italy, filed application for a
writ of habeas corpus on the ground that "no valid treaty existed
between the United States and Italy authorizing his extradition."8 3
Argento claimed that the treaty of extradition between the United
States and Italy of March 23, 1868, as amended" had been abro-
gated upon the outbreak of war between the United States and
Italy. He asserted that the notification to Italy by the Department
of State that the United States, in accordance with Article XLIV of
the Treaty of Peace with Italy cited above was "null and void and of
no effect because it emanated from the State Department of the
U. S. Government"8' 5 and was therefore "the usurpation of a power
belonging to the U. S. Senate alone.""6 Argento contended that the
80. Peace Treaty with Italy, Article 44 (61 Stat. (2) 1245 (1947),
T.I.A.S. 1648) ; Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, Article 8 (61 Stat. (2) 1915
(1947), T.I.A.S. 1650) ; Treaty of Peace with Hungary, Article 10 (61 Stat.
(2) 2065 (1947), T.I.A.S. 1651) ; Treaty of Peace with Rumania, Article 10
(61 Stat. (2) 1757 (1947), T.I.A.S. 1649); Treaty of Peace with Japan,
Article 7 (T.I.A.S. 2490).
81. For notification by the United States see: with respect to Hungary,
1S Dep't State Bull. 382 (1948) ; with respect to Bulgaria, id. at 383; with
respect to Rumania, id. at 356; with respect to Japan, 28 Dep't State Bull. 721
(1953) ; with respect to Italy, id. at 248.
82. Argento v. North, 131 F. Supp. 538 (1955), affd sub. nomn.,
Argento v. Horn, 241 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1957). See discussion in Oliver,
Treaties, the Senate, and the Constitution, 51 Am. J. Intl L. 606, 610 (1957).
83. 131 F. Supp. 538 (1955).
84. 15 Stat. 629, 16 Stat. 767, and 24 Stat 1001.
85. 131 F. Supp. 538, 539-40 (1955).
86. Id. at 540.
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only way in which the treaty could be revived was through action
by the Senate of the United States. Judge Connell recognized the
"ingenious" character of the challenge but invoked the well-known
doctrine of the "political question" in order to avoid passing upon
the specific issue raised. He said:
... for this court to hold that such treaty does not exist at all
for the reasons claimed by the relator, would be tantamount to
judicially deciding that for the past eight years on the twelve
highly important subjects set forth in such treaty, our govern-
ment has constantly acted without authority of law, and that
our U. S. Senate has meanwhile utterly failed in understanding,
appreciating, or doing its plain duty. It would further be tanta-
mount to judicially deciding that until future prospective treaties
on such twelve highly important subjects can be again negotiated
by the executive branch of our government and ratified by the
U. S. Senate, or specifically revived by approval of the U. S.
Senate, that all such international relationships now in force or
process are null, void, and of no legal effect.
87
Judge Connell's opinion was based upon the assumption that the
war had not abrogated the extradition treaty but had only suspended
its operation. He continued:
There is little or nothing in the twelve phases of international
relationships aforementioned between these two countries which
could be said to be so incompatible with war as to justify a
judicial determination that this treaty was abrogated: and it
was most desirable that such relationships be immediately re-
sumed and that the original status of the parties in these twelve
respects be quickly re-established. Such resumption of such
status did not require the specific approval of the U. S. Senate
because the decision thus made to resume relationships was po-
litical in its nature and with propriety was so determined by the
political department of our government. The U. S. Senate ap-
proved them all originally; war then made it physically im-
possible for their continuity but war had no intrinsic incom-
patibility towards the relationship itself. The only decision herein
made was that such relationship be resumed, revived and kept
in force since the physical reason for its discontinuance had
- ended."
The crux of the opinion is the assumption by the court that the
extradition treaty was not abrogated by the state of war between
the U. S. and Italy. In affirming, the circuit court covered approxi-
mately the same ground that had been covered by Judge Counell."9
The court held that "the treaty of extradition between the United
87. Ibid.
88. Id. at 540-41.
89. Argento v. Horn, 241 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1957).
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States and Italy was not terminated but merely suspended during
the war and that it is now in effect." 90 The court also placed primary
emphasis upon the action of the political departments:
Counsel have cited us to no decision, and we have found none,
specifically relating to the effect of war upon a treaty of extradi-
tion. Such a treaty does not conveniently fit into either of the
alternative classifications set out in the ].arnuth opinion quoted
above. If the question were to be decided in a vacuum, the con-
clusion could only be that it is extremely doubtful that war ipso
facto abrogates a treaty of extradition. Fortunately, however,
the question need not be so decided, but can and must be decided
against the background of the actual conduct of the two nations
involved, acting through the political branches of their govern-
ments.91
If the treaty had been terminated by the war, the contention of the
relator, Argento, would have been valid. However, under the
present law as determined by the Supreme Court in Terlinden v.
Ames " and Charlton v. Kelly,93 an executive declaration respecting
the status of a treaty cannot be successfully challenged in the courts.
In the present cases, the district court declared the action of the
State Department in delivering notification to the Italian Govern-
ment in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of Peace "was
not only entitled to great weight but so much so as to constrain
us to consider it determinative of the question before us."9' The
circuit court opinion was more cautious in dealing with this facet
of the question.95 Although not expressly mentioned by judge Con-
nell, the position of the executive branch was seemingly made im-
pregnable by the fact that the Senate had given its express approval
to the procedure followed by the Department of State when it ad-
vised and constented to the ratification of the Treaty of Peace with
Italy. On this point, the circuit court observe-d:
The consummation of the treaty of peace with Italy in 1947
containing Article 44 providing for 'notification' by the United
States of each prewar bilateral treaty it desired to keep in force
or revive, the ratification of that treaty by the United States
Senate, the subsequent notification by our State Department
with regard to the extradition treaty, and the conduct of the
political departments of the two nations in the ensuing nine years,
evidencing their unqualified understanding that the extradition
treaty is in full force and effect, all make it obvious that the
90. Id. at 263.
91. Id. at 262.
92. 184 U.S. 270, 288 (1902).
93. 229 U.S. 447, 475 (1913).
94. 131 F. Supp. 538, 542 (1955).
95. See 241 F.2d 258, 263 (1957).
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political departments of the two governments considered the
extradition treaty not abrogated but merely suspended during
hostilities."'
The Argento case 97 added to the developing case law on the subject
of the effect of war on treaties. The most important case relating to
this subject and the most important court decision relating directly
to the termination of treaties during the period emphasized in this
study is Clark v. Allen. * The case dealt with the effect of war on a
bilateral treaty, the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular
Rights of 1923 between the United States and Germany.99 The ques-
tion of the effect of war on treaties is a most complex and contro-
versial one, a question of international law on which there is very
wide disagreement. 00 Although the opinion of the court did not
bring order out of chaos in the international realm, it definitely
placed the Supreme Court's stamp of approval on the American
trend toward minimizing the effect of war on bilateral treaty obli-
gations.10 The Supreme Court had spoken on this question on two
previous occasions.10 2 A dictum by Justice Bushrod Washington in
Society v. New Haven established a precedent for the present prac-
tice. In discussing the effect of the War of 1812 upon Article VI
of the Treaty of Peace with England of 1783,103 he asserted:
But we are not inclined to admit the doctrine urged at the bar,
that treaties become extinguished ipso facto, by war between the
two governments, unless they should be revived by an expressed
or implied renewal on the return of peace. Whatever may be the
latitude of doctrine laid down by elementary writers on the law
of nations, dealing in general terms, in relation to this subject,
we are satisfied, that the doctrine contended for is not universally
true. There may be treaties of such a nature, as to their object
and import, as that war will put an end to them; but where
96. Id. at 262.
97. See supra note 82.
98. 331 U.S: 503 (1947).
99. 44 Stat. 2132 (1927).
100. Harvard Law School, supra note 6, 1183-1203; Lenoir, Effect of
War on Bilateral Treaties, 34 Geo. L.J. 129 (1945) ; McDonald, supra note 2;
Castel, InternationaltLaw: Effect of War on Bilateral Treaties; Comparative
Studies, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 556 (1953) ; Karnuth v. United States, 279 U.S.
231, 236 (1929).
101. For recent comments by the Department of State with respect to
the question of the effect of war on the termination of treaties, see U.S. Dep't
of State, Law of Treaties as Applied by the Government of the United States
of America 201ff, (unpublished, Mar. 31, 1950) ; cf. Hacklvorth, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 377-90.
102. Society v. New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464, 494 (1823); Karnuth v.
United States, 279 U.S. 231 (1929).
103. 8 Stat. 80,83 (1783).
104. Society v. New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464, 494 (1823).
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treaties contemplate a permanent arrangement of territorial,
and other national rights, or which, in their terms, are meant
to provide for the event of an intervening war, it would be
against every principle of just interpretation, to hold them ex-
tinguished by the event of war ... We think, therefore, that
treaties stipulating for permanent rights, and general arrange-
ments, and professing to aim at perpetuity, and to deal with the
case of war as well as of peace, do not cease on the occurrence of
war, but are, at most, only suspended while it lasts; and unless
they are waived by the parties, or new and repugnant stipulations
made, they revive in their operations at the return of peace.10'
In 1929, after the lapse of more than a century, the Court on6e more
had an opportunity to pass upon the issue.:05 Although the Court,
speaking through justice Sutherland, was careful to reconcile
its opinion with the previous pronouncement by Justice Washing-
ton,1 0 it nevertheless held Article III of the Jay Treaty of 1794107 to
have been abrogated by the War of 1812. The finding of the Court
was based on the conclusion that an open frontier was incompatible
with a state of war. The relevant portion of Justice Sutherland's
opinion is as follows: ".... the passing and repassing of citizens or
subjects of one sovereignty into the territory of another is incon-
sistent with the condition of hostility."' 0'
The specific issue before the Court in Clark v. Allen was the
question as to whether the outbreak of World War II had abro-
gated the reciprocal inheritance provisions cf the Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce, and Consular Rights between the United States
and Germany. 0 9
The facts of the case may be summarized briefly. Alvina Wagner,
a resident of California, died in 1942, requeathing her estate to na-
tionals and residents of Germany to the exclusion of California
heirs-at-law. The right of the German heirs to inherit depended
upon the status of the reciprocal inheritance provisions of the Treaty
of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights with Germany." 0
Subsequently, in 1943, the alien property custodian "vested in him-
self all right, title and interest of the German nationals in the
estate of this decedent" and instituted prozeedings in the district
105. Karnuth v. United States, 279 U.S. 231, 239 (1929).
106. Ibid.
107. 8 Stat. 116, 117, art. III (1794) : "It is agreed that it shall at all
times be free to his Majesty's subjects, and to the citizens of the United States,
and also to the Indians dwelling on either side of the said boundary line,
freely to pass and repass by land or inland navigation, into the respective
territories, and countries of the two parties, on the continent of America...."
108. 279 U.S. 231, 239 (1929).
109. 44 Stat. 2132, 2135, art. IV (1927).
110. Ibid.
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court against the executor of the estate and the California heirs-at-
law for "a determination that they had no interest in the estate
and that he was entitled to the entire net estate, after payment of
administration and other expenses." The district court ruled in favor
of the Alien Property Custodian."" The circuit court reversed on
the ground that the district court was without jurisdiction.1 2 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari, held that the district court had
jurisdiction, and remanded the case to the court of appeals for con-
sideration on the merits."" On the merits, the circuit court held for
respondent's holding that the treaty provisions had been abro-
gated." 4 The case came to the Supreme Court for a second time." 5
Although the Supreme Court was passing upon the effect of the
outbreak of war upon a reciprocal inheritance provision in a bilateral
treaty for the first time, the question had previously been passed
upon on more than one occasion by a state supreme court, the
leading case being Techt v. Hughes.'" In each instance, the court
had held that the treaty provision had survived the outbreak of war.
The Techt opinion was particularly esteemed because it had been
written by Benjamin Cardozo, later to be numbered among the
most respected justices of the Supreme Court. As a matter of fact,
the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Douglas, incorporated
the heart of the Techt opinion and endowed it with the sanctity of
the supreme law of the land. Justice Douglas asserted:
We start from the premise that the outbreak of war does not
necessarily suspend or abrogate treaty provisions.... There may
of course be, such an incompatibility between a particular treaty
provision and the maintenance of a state of war as to make clear
that it should not be enforced.... Or the Chief Executive or the
Congress may have formulated a national policy quite incon-
sistent with the enforcement of a treaty in whole or in part. This
was the view stated in Techt v. Hughes, and we believe it to be
the correct one:.. . 'The question is not what states may do after
war has supervened, and this without breach of their duty as
members of the society of nations. The question is what are to
presume that they have done.... President and Senate may de-
nounce the treaty, and thus terminate its life. Congress may enact
111. Crowley v. Allen, 52 F. Supp. 850 (1943).
112. Allen v. Markham, 147 F.2d 136 (1945).
113. Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490 (1946).
114. Allen v. Markham, 156 F.2d 653 (1946).
115. A complete statement of the facts appears at 331 U.S. 503, 505(1947).
116. 229 N.Y. 222, 128 N.E. 185 (1920) ; see also Goos v. Brocks, 117
Neb. 750, 223 N.W. 13 (1929) ; State v. Reardon, 120 Kan. 614, 245 P. 158(1926). For a similar subsequent opinion, see In re Meyers Eftate, 107 Cal.
App. 799, 238 P.2d 597 (1951) ; and discussion in Lesser, Treaty Provisions
Dealing with Bilateral Treaties, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 573 (1953).
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an inconsistent rule, which will control the action of the courts.
The treaty of peace itself may set up new relations, and terminate'
earlier compacts either tacitly or expressly. . . .' But until some
one of these things is done, until some one of these events occurs,
while war is still flagrant, and the will of the political depart-
ments of the government unrevealed, the courts, as I view their
function, play a humbler and more cautious part. It is not for
them to denounce treaties generally, en bloc. Their part it is, as
one provision or another is involved in some actual controversy
between them, to determine whether alone or by force of con-
nection with an inseparable scheme, the provision is inconsistent
with the policy or safety of the nation in the emergency of war,
and hence presumably intended to be limited to times of peace.
The mere fact that other portions of the treaty are suspended or
even abrogated is not conclusive. The treaty does not fall in its
entirety unless it has the character of an indivisible act.-1 7
The language of the Court supports two co'nclusions which appear
to sum up the municipal law of the United States with respect to
the question of the effect of war on bilateral treaties. (1) The politi-
cal departments of the government may determine in the first in-
stance whether a treaty has been abrogated by the outbreak of war,
and the courts will be bound by the political decision.,, (2) In the
absence of an expressed declaration or the adoption of an ascertain-
able policy to the contrary by the political departments of the
government, the Court will not consider the provisions of a bilateral
treaty to have been abrogated by the outbreak of war except where
the enforcement of the treaty provisions would be detrimental to
the national interest or otherwise incompatibre with a state of war. 19
In summary, it may be said that the problem of terminating inter-
national agreements in the United States is four dimensional. First,
all international agreements must be terminated in accordance with
the norms of general international law, as well as in accordance with
the internal or municipal law. Secondly, the municipal law of the
United States recognizes two distinct types of international agree-
ments, treaties and executive agreements. Practice demonstrates
that it has been the policy of the United States to terminate all inter-
national agreements, treaties and executive agreements, in accord-
ance with the rules of international law.
The problem of treaty termination is complicated by the diffusion
of the foreign relations power of the United States among the Presi-
117. 331 U.S. 503, 508 (1947).
118. The cited portion of the Techt opinion stipulated denunciation by
the President and Senate, but it is clear that denunciation could be accom-
plished by any one of the five methods set forth on p. ... , supra.
119. Divergence between United States and foreign practice is treated
by MacDonald, supra note 2; Castel, supra note 10D.
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dent, the Senate, and the Congress and the failure of the framers to
make any express provision for the termination of treaties. Diplo-
matic practice coupled with judicial opinion demonstrates that the
President as the chief organ of foreign relations, has the primary
responsibility with respect to the termination of treaties. He may
perform this function alone or in conjunction with the Congress or
the Senate. The Congress, on the other hand, may suspend the
internal operation of a treaty by the passage of conflicting legislation
or by refusal to pass necessary implementing legislation. Congres-
tional action alone, however, cannot relieve the nation of its inter-
national responsibility.
Except for the fact that the Senate has no separate role to play,
executive agreements are terminable by the same methods as treaties.
As in the case of treaties, Congress can suspend the internal enforce-
ment of an executive agreement by the passage of conflicting legis-
lation, by refusal to enact implementing legislation, or by the termi-
nation of statutory delegation of power to the President. The Con-
gress cannot, however, terminate ipso facto the international obli-
gation which the United States has assumed in such agreements.
The courts have recognized that the primary responsibility for
terminating international agreements belongs to the political
branches of the government. The courts must, however, when called
upon to do so, resolve difficult questions relating to the termination
of international agreements. The actual power of termination is a
political power; and, in this respect, presidential authority, though
not exclusive, is paramount.
[Vol. 42:879
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Volume 42 April, 1958 No. 5
Warren J. Daheim
Note Editor
- BOARD OF EDITORS
Charles R. Edelstein
President
Donald C. Knutson
Article and Book Review Editor
David C. Forsberg
Recent Case Editor
Bruce E. Clubb
Research Editor
Charles M. Skinner, Jr.
Assistant Recent Case Editor
Michael A. Berens
Jerrold F. Bergfalk
David E. Boes
Donald R. Herbert
Robert E. Beck
Bertin A. Bisbee, Jr.
Lawrence C. Brown
Robert A. Guzy
Kenneth H. Holmes
Ronald A. Jacks
Gary J. Meyer
Lawrence E. Nerheim
Ralph T. Smith
Robert C. Swenson
STAFF MEMBERS
Norris C. Hystad
Robert J. Miller
Donald C. Petersen
Stephen B. Scallen
Ralph L. Strangis
Ralph S. Towler
Ronald J. Werner
Ronald J. Wolf
Lawrence Zelle
A. Nicol Smith
Thomas M. Vogt
Richard E. Wetherall
Lawrence A. Willey
$5.50 Per Annum $1.75 Per Number
Back numbers and volumes (unbound) available at $1.75 per number, $5.50 per volume.
Member, National Conference of Law Reviews
CONTRIBUTORS TO THE SYMPOSIUM
GERnAID BEBR. J.U.D. 1946, Charles University, Prague; LL.M. 1948, J.S.D.
1951, Yale University. Lecturer in Law, Yale University School of Law.
WILLIAM W. BISHOP, Ja. A.B. 1928, J.D. 1931, University of Michigan.
Member of the Michigan Bar. Admitted to practice before the United
States Supreme Court. Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law
School. AuTHoR: International Law (2d ed. 1953); The Structure of
Federal Power over Foreign Affairs, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 299 (1952) ; and
articles in other legal periodicals.
S~waicE: W. GREEN. A.B. 1950, Harvard College; LL.B. 1953, Harvard Law
School. Former Law Clerk to Judge George T. Washington of the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Member of the New York and
District of Columbia Bars.
CHARLES H. McLAUGHLIN. B.A. 1929, M.A. 1934, University of Denver;
LL.B. 1935, Harvard Law School. Member of the Colorado Bar. Profes-
sor of Political Science and Director of the Center for International
Relations and Area Studies, University of Minnesota. Atrrroa: Historical
and Genealogical Records of the Devenish Families of England and
Ireland (with Devenish, 1948); World Politics in Transition (with
Mills, 1956); Legislative Neutrality in the United States, 22 Minn. L.
Rev. 603 (1938) ; Neutral Rights under International Law in the Euro-
pean War, 1939-41, 26 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 177 (1942).
RANBALL H. NELSON. B.A. 1950, M.A. 1951, Ph.D. 1956, University of Michi-
gan. Assistant Professor of Government, Southern Illinois University.
CovEY T. OLIvER. B.A. 1933, LL.B. 1936, University of Texas; LL.M. 1953,
J.S.D. 1954, Columbia University School of Law. Member of the Texas
Bar. Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. AuTHoR:
Contemporary Problems of Treaty Law (1955) ; The Cooperative De-
fense of Europe, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 795 (1952) ; and articles in other legal
periodicals.
HERMAN WALKER, JR. AB. 1931, Ph.D. 1937, Duke University. Former ad-
viser on commercial treaties, Department of State. First Secretary, United
States Embassy, Paris.
ALFRED AvI s. B.A. 1954, Hunter College; LL.B. 1956, Columbia University
School of Law; LL.M. 1957, New York University School of Law.
Member of District of Columbia, Florida and New York Bars. Instructor
in Law, Rutgers University School of Law. AuTHOR: The Law of AWOL
(1957).
DmK W. Bowr. M.A., LL.B., University of Cambridge; Ph.D., Univer-
sity of Manchester. Sometime Whewell Scholar in International Law,
University of Cambridge. Lecturer in Law, University of Manchester.
Seconded to Legal Office of the United Nations. Barrister-at-Law of the
Middle Temple and of the Northern Circuit. AUTHOR: Self-Defence in
International Law (1958).
ALBERT HENRY GARTrsoN. A.B. 1931, Whitman College; M.A. 1932, Ameri-
can University; B.A. (Juris) 1934, Oxford University; LL.B. 1942,
Syracuse University. Member of the New Y6rk Bar. Carnegie Fellow in
International Law, 1935. Professor of Law, New York University.
R. K. RAMAZANI. B.A. 1947, Mervey College; LL.M. 1951, Tehran Law
School; S.J.D. 1954, University of Virginia Law School. Assistant Pro-
fessor of Middle Eastern Affairs and International Law, Woodrow Wil-
son Department of Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia.
QUIccY WRIGHT. A.B. 1912, LL.D. 1923, Lombard College; A.M. 1913, Ph.D.
1915, University of Illinois. Professor of International Law Emeritus,
University of Chicago. Visiting Professor of International Law, Indian
School'of International Studies, New Delhi. AUTHOR: Professor Wright
has written numerous books and articles on International Law, the latest
of which is: International Law and the United Nations (1956).
